P ublic and private payers in the United States are implementing alternative models to fee-for-service payment in an effort to control the growth of health care spending and to improve outcomes. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] One alternative payment model, introduced by the state of Maryland, gives each of the state's hospitals an annual global budget for inpatient, hospital outpatient, and emergency department care. By severing the link between volume and revenue, Maryland's hospital budget program creates financial incentives for hospitals to deter expensive hospital utilization, including admissions and emergency department visits, and to expand other services, such as primary care. 12, 13 Among alternative payment models, Maryland's policy is unique because it places care in each hospital under a budget and because it encompasses all payers, including Medicare, Medicaid, and commercial insurers. 14 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has expressed interest in implementing hospital global budgets elsewhere in the United States 15 and is developing a similar program for rural hospitals in Pennsylvania. 16 Maryland's global budget program was established to meet performance goals of a waiver with CMS. 17 This waiver, which was enacted on January 1, 2014, requires Maryland to limit hospital spending growth and to meet certain quality targets, including a reduction of readmissions.
14 The CMS has reported that, since 2014, the rate of hospital spending growth has slowed in Maryland, putting the state on track to meet requirements of its waiver. 18 By setting budgets for hospitals, Maryland can largely control hospital spending in the state. What remains unclear is how hospitals met their budgets. Under the structure of Maryland's program, hospitals can lower spending by reducing hospital utilization and enhancing primary care-as policymakers intended-or by reducing their prices.
12,13
Numerous reports have described efforts by Maryland hospitals to deter hospitalizations by opening new primary care clinics and expanding outpatient services for individuals with chronic conditions. [19] [20] [21] [22] One report found that hospitalization and readmission rates declined among Medicare beneficiaries in Maryland in the first year of the program, 23 while a CMS-funded evaluation conducted among Medicare beneficiaries found reductions in hospital admissions, increases in emergency department visits, and no changes in primary care associated with the program. 24 We examined hospital and primary care use through the second year (2015) of Maryland's global budget program using a difference-in-differences analysis that compared changes in utilization among Medicare beneficiaries in Maryland with changes among similar out-of-state beneficiaries.
Methods

Maryland's Hospital Global Budget Program
Maryland's global budget program builds on the state's hospital rate-setting system, which was created in the 1970s and establishes a set of regulated rates at which hospitals bill all payers. This system exempts Maryland hospitals from Medicare's national inpatient and outpatient Prospective Payment Systems. [25] [26] [27] Like Medicare's national hospital payment programs, Maryland's prior system paid hospitals per Diagnosis Related Group (for inpatient care) or per service (outpatient care) without constraining total revenue. Thus, hospitals could increase their revenues by providing more care. Maryland's new payment system gives each nonfederal acute care hospital in the state an annual all-payer budget for inpatient, emergency department, and hospital outpatient department (HOPD) services. By constraining hospitals' revenues, the program counteracts incentives to provide more care in the hospital and enables Maryland to meet spending targets of its waiver-specifically, limiting all-payer hospital spending growth to less than 3.58% per year and generating $330 million in Medicare savings over 5 years (based on the difference between Medicare hospital spending growth in Maryland and all other states).
14 Global budget agreements were negotiated and finalized for all 36 hospitals eligible for the program by July 2014, although the budgets were retroactive to January 1 of the year. 24 (These 36 hospitals joined 10 hospitals in rural Maryland that remained on global budgets through an earlier pilot program, 28 which is not examined in this study.)
Hospital budgets are determined from several factors, including historical utilization, regulated prices, and operating costs. 29 While hospitals continue to bill per admission or per service, they are now expected to raise or lower their prices throughout the year-as much as a 5% increase or reduction from initial regulated levels-to target an annual amount of total revenue. Hospitals that reduce utilization increase their prices (and presumably their margins), while hospitals with excess volume must lower their prices. This gives hospitals an incentive to reduce utilization subject to a budget and to refer patients for care in other settings, including independent primary care practices.
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To remove the incentive to divert patients to other hospitals, Maryland's program includes provisions to adjust hospitals' budgets based on shifts in volume that do not reflect improvements in care. 30 
Study Sample
We examined changes in hospital and primary care use in the Medicare population because the high chronic disease burden and rate of hospital use among those in this population make it likely to be affected by the payment change. Owing to the use of deidentified patient data, the Harvard institutional review board determined that the study did not involve human subjects and was thus exempt from review. We analyzed 2009 through 2015 Medicare Part A and Part B claims for a random 20% sample of beneficiaries enrolled in fee-for-service Medicare for at least 1 full year or until death. To assess established diagnoses, we limited the sample in each study year to beneficiaries with continuous fee-for-service enrollment in the prior year. We included all beneficiaries living in 8 Maryland counties where the hospitals received global budgets beginning in 2014 ( Figure 1) .
12,35 This 8-county region included 32 of the 36 hospitals entering the 2014 program. The 32 hospitals accounted for 88% of admissions from Medicare beneficiaries residing in this 8-county region. Hospitals in the 4 excluded counties served primarily rural communities, including some with seasonally variable tourist populations (eAppendix in the Supplement). We conducted analyses on an intention-totreat basis, considering all beneficiaries in the 8 intervention counties to be exposed to the program regardless of where they received care.
To select a control group, we used coarsened exact matching 36 to match each of the 8 intervention counties to outof-state control counties with similar numbers of hospitals, hospital beds, and physicians per capita; poverty rates; proportions of African American residents; and population densities (eAppendix in the Supplement). Preliminary analyses indicated that these county characteristics were predictive of hospitalization trends in the fee-for-service Medicare population.
Patient Covariates
From Medicare enrollment data, we determined beneficiaries' age, sex, race and ethnicity, whether disability was the original reason for Medicare eligibility, receipt of Medicaid benefits (ie, dual eligibility), and the presence of end-stage renal disease. From the Chronic Conditions Data Warehouse (CCW), we assessed each beneficiary's accumulated burden of 27 chronic conditions prior to each study year. Using enrollment information and diagnoses reported on prioryear claims, we calculated each beneficiary's Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) risk score, which is used for risk adjustment in Medicare programs. 37 Finally, we incorporated data from the Census Bureau's American Community Survey to measure the poverty rate and proportion of residents with less than a high school education in the Zip Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) where beneficiaries resided.
Outcomes
We used the Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MedPAR) and outpatient claims files to construct several measures of hospital utilization, which we assessed annually for beneficiaries. First, given recent and substantial increases in the provision of observation-unit care in lieu of short-stay admissions, 38,39 we constructed a combined measure of admissions and observation stays, which we term hospital stays. Second, because Maryland's policy gives hospitals additional incentives to avoid readmissions, 32,40 we assessed the proportion of patients' annual admissions and observation stays that were followed by a second hospital stay within 30 days (we term these 30-day return hospital stays). In subanalyses, we assessed changes in inpatient admissions and observation stays separately (reported in the eAppendix in the Supplement). Third, using the outpatient claims file, we assessed visits to hospital emergency departments that did not lead to admission. Fourth, to summarize patients' use of the wide range of services in HOPDs, we applied national procedure-code level prices to HOPD claims to construct a price-standardized measure of HOPD utilization. Because hospital prices were subject to change under Maryland's program, we measured prices from hospitals outside of the state (eAppendix in the Supplement). To analyze changes in utilization of primary care, we used the carrier (physician/supplier) file to assess beneficiaries' annual visits with primary care physicians in HOPDs or independent physician offices and the proportion of hospital stays followed by a primary care visit within 7 days of discharge or observation. 41 
Statistical Analysis
We used a difference-in-differences design to assess changes in utilization from the baseline period (pooling 2009 through 2013) to the first (2014) and second (2015) years of Maryland's program, comparing the health care utilization of Medicare beneficiaries in the 8 intervention vs 27 control counties.
We conducted 2 sets of analyses based on different assumptions. First, we assessed differential changes in Maryland from the preintervention to the postintervention periods, assuming that differences in outcomes between Maryland and the control group would have remained constant past 2014 had Maryland not implemented global budgets. This approach, which is standard in difference-in-difference studies, relies on the assumption of parallel preintervention trends in Maryland and the control group. 42 However, it could produce biased estimates if preintervention trends differ. Therefore, in a second analysis, we assumed that differences between Maryland and the control group would have continued to change at the preintervention rate in the absence of Maryland's program-analogous to an approach used in other analyses of Maryland's reform. 24, 29 This approach yields an estimate of changes in Maryland vs the control group, net of changes that would be expected from a continuation of the groups' preintervention trends past 2014.
Estimates of differential changes were obtained from linear regression models with the patient-year as the unit of analysis and were adjusted for patients' health status in the prior year (including established chronic conditions from the CCW), demographic characteristics, ZCTA-level poverty and education, and geography. Models were estimated with propensityscore weights that balanced observed characteristics of beneficiaries in Maryland and the control counties in each year. (Additional details of our analyses are provided in the eAppendix in the Supplement.)
Sensitivity Analyses
We conducted 2 sensitivity analyses. First, to assess whether our estimates were sensitive to the control group used and to other policy changes coinciding with Maryland's reform, we compared Maryland with urban areas of states that also implemented the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion in early 2014 (eTable 8 in the Supplement). 43 Second, we built on the first sensitivity analysis by conducting a placebo analysis. 44 To conduct this analysis, we iteratively assigned an indicator of treatment status to each control state that expanded Medicaid in early 2014 and estimated differential changes in this "placebo" state vs the remaining control states. To assess whether changes in Maryland were within or outside the range of changes among other states, we plotted our findings from the first sensitivity analysis against the range of placebo estimates (eAppendix in the Supplement).
Results
In 2014, our study sample included 94 697 fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries in the 8 intervention counties in Maryland and 206 389 beneficiaries in the matched control counties. Before weighting, beneficiaries in Maryland were slightly older and more likely to be African American than patients in the control counties but were less likely to have qualified for Medicare because of a disability or have dual Medicare and Medicaid eligibility ( Table 1) . After weighting to balance observable patient characteristics, we found that the distribution of categorical variables and means of continuous variables were identical in both groups.
Differences in Preintervention (2009-2013) Trends
Adjusted preintervention trends in Maryland differed appreciably from those of the control group for 30-day return hospital stays, nonadmitted emergency department visits, pricestandardized HOPD utilization, and primary care visits (in aggregate and following a hospital stay; Table 2 and Figure 2 ). From 2009 through 2012, we found comparable changes in hospital stays in Maryland and the control group, followed by a divergence in the groups' trends from 2012 to 2013.
Changes in Utilization Following the Introduction of Hospital Global Budgets
There were no statistically significant year-1 (2014) differential changes in any outcomes we assessed using either trend assumption (eTable 7 in the Supplement).
In the preintervention period (2009-2013), annual hospital utilization in Maryland averaged 40.9 stays per 100 beneficiaries. When we assumed hospital use would have changed comparably in Maryland and the control group without global budgets (ie, assuming parallel trends), we estimated a differential change in Maryland of −0.47 annual hospital stays per 100 beneficiaries from the preintervention period to 2015 (95% CI, −1.65 to 0.72; P = .43; Figure 2 and Table 2 ), or −1.1% of the state's preintervention average. However, assuming that diverging preintervention trends would have continued past 2014 without the global budget program, we estimated a differential change in Maryland of −1.24 annual hospital stays per 100 beneficiaries (95% CI, −2.46 to −0.02; P = .047), or −3.0% of Maryland's baseline.
During the preintervention period, the rate of 30-day return hospital stays in Maryland averaged 21.5% per year. Assuming parallel trends, return hospital stays declined differentially in Maryland from the preintervention period to 2015 (differential change: −1.0 percentage points per year; 95% CI, −2.0 to −0.1; P = .03; Table 2 ), or −4.7% of the state's preintervention rate. However, assuming that preexisting differences in trends would have continued, we found a differential change of −0.6 percentage points (95% CI, −2.2 to 1.1; P = .50), constituting a 2.8% decrease from Maryland's baseline.
Assuming parallel trends, we found a differential change of 0.2 annual emergency visits per 100 beneficiaries in Maryland (95% CI, −1.8 to 2.2; P = .82; assuming differential trends, we found a differential change of −1.2 annual visits per 100 beneficiaries (95% CI, −2.8 to 0.3; P = .11), or −3.1% of the state's baseline. Estimates of differential changes in primary care visits varied based on whether we assumed parallel trends (differential change in Maryland: +10.6 annual visits/100 beneficiaries; 95% CI, 4.6 to 16.6; P = .001; Table 2 ) or differential trends (differential change in Maryland: −0.8 visits/100 beneficiaries; 95% CI, −10.6 to 9.0; P = .87). While not statistically significant, estimates of differential changes in pricestandardized HOPD use also differed when we assumed parallel vs differential trends (−$56 vs +$40, respectively). There were no consistent differential changes in postdischarge primary care comparing the 2 trend assumptions.
Among beneficiaries in the 8 Maryland counties, the proportion of admissions to the 32 global budget hospitals, vs outof-state or other Maryland hospitals, did not change substantially from the preintervention period (88.4%) to the postintervention period (87.6%).
Sensitivity Analyses
Our results were substantively unchanged when we compared Maryland with an alternate control group of Medicaid expansion states (eTable 9 in the Supplement). Changes in Maryland vs other Medicaid expansion states were within the range of changes estimated in placebo analyses (eFigure 1 in the Supplement).
Discussion
This study examined changes in hospital and primary care use associated with the 2014 introduction of global budgets in Maryland hospitals. We conducted difference-in- We continued to find inconsistent results when we compared Maryland with an alternative control group of Medicaid expansion states. Furthermore, placebo analyses indicated that changes in Maryland were well within the range of changes in other states. Together, these findings provide no clear evidence that Maryland hospitals met their budgets by reducing hospital utilization or enhancing primary care beyond changes that would have been expected in the absence of global budgets.
There are several possible explanations for why we did not find strong evidence of population-level changes in hospital or primary care use associated with Maryland's program. First, because hospitals' budgets did not include payments to physicians for care provided in the hospital or in community settings, the program could have had limited influence on physician behavior. Other alternative payment models, including Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), place physicians or both physicians and hospitals at risk for patients' spending and outcomes of care, 2,4,6 whereas only hospitals bore risk in Maryland's program. While Maryland initially proposed to share a proportion of hospitals' savings b Preintervention trend difference estimated from an interaction between a linear preintervention time trend and an indicator that a patient lived in Maryland, controlling for year fixed effects, patient characteristics, and geography, with weights to balance the patient samples in Maryland and the control counties (see eAppendix in the Supplement for details). Confidence intervals were constructed using standard errors clustered at the county level.
c Absolute differential changes estimated using a patient-and year-level linear regression model adjusted for year fixed effects, patient characteristics, and geography, and weighted using propensity score-derived weights to balance the observed characteristics of patients in Maryland and the control counties in each year (see the eAppendix in the Supplement for details). Confidence intervals were constructed using standard errors clustered at the county level. Differential changes relative to the preintervention annual mean in Maryland are reported in the text.
d That is, assuming that changes from the preintervention period to 2015 would have been comparable in Maryland and the control group had Maryland not implemented hospital global budgets (see Methods and the eAppendix in the Supplement for details).
e That is, assuming that the difference in trends between Maryland and the control group during the preintervention period would have continued through 2015 had Maryland not implemented hospital global budgets (see the Methods section and the eAppendix in the Supplement for details).
f Inpatient admissions plus observation stays.
g For each patient and in each year, we assessed the proportion of hospital stays (inpatient admissions or observation stays) that were followed by a second hospital stay within 30 days. Analyses of this outcome were limited to patients with at least 1 hospital stay in a year and were weighted by beneficiaries' annual hospital stays.
h Emergency department visits not resulting in an inpatient admission.
i Price-weighted sum of hospital outpatient department utilization. To control for price differences across regions, as well as any effects of price adjustments resulting from Maryland's global budget program, we computed a mean price per outpatient service (measured at the level of HCPCS codes [Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System]) using national Medicare claims data (excluding Maryland providers), and applied this mean price to all hospital outpatient department claims. Hospital outpatient department spending includes facility payments only.
j Primary care visits occurring in a hospital outpatient department or in independent physician offices. See the eAppendix in the Supplement for the procedure, clinician specialty, and place of service codes used to identify these services.
k Primary care visit within 7 days of a hospital stay. Analyses of this outcome were limited to patients with at least 1 hospital stay in a year and were weighted by beneficiaries' annual hospital stays. with physicians to promote incentive alignment, the CMS did not approve these plans in the state's original payment model. In updates to the model, Maryland plans to expand the scope of budgets to include physicians and to establish ACO-like organizations to manage Medicare beneficiaries' inpatient and outpatient spending. 45 Second, although Maryland's program established annual budgets for hospitals, hospitals were still paid on a per- 
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Conclusions
In conclusion, 2 years after the introduction of hospital global budgets in Maryland, we found no consistent evidence that changes in hospital or primary care could be reliably attributed to the program. Further monitoring is needed to assess how hospitals adapt to this payment model over time. Payment Reforms .......................................................................................................................................... Rate-Setting System ...................................................................................................... Global Budget Revenue Program .................................................. Budget Revenue Program ............................................................................... ' global budgets? ................................................................................................ 's HSCRC? ...................................................................................  C. Hospital payment ........................................................................................................................................... Matching results ............................................................................................................................................. .........................................................................................................................   A. Alternate Control Group ............................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................................. ................................................................................................................................ Under Maryland's hospital rate-setting system, an independent state regulatory agency, known as the Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC), administers prices for all inpatient, hospital outpatient, and emergency department services. Although the price of a given service is set equal across all payers within the same hospital, prices vary across hospitals, reflecting differences in their operating costs and teaching status. 2 For example, in 2016, the daily medical surgical ICU payment rate at Johns Hopkins Hospital was $2,751, versus $1,923 at Greater Baltimore Medical Center, which is located in suburban Baltimore County. 3 In general, all payers must reimburse hospitals at regulated rates, although the HSCRC allows small price discounts for public payers and for prompt payment. In particular, Medicare and Medicaid are both granted a -6% price differential under Maryland's system. However, elsewhere in the U.S., hospital prices paid by Medicare are often 40-50% lower than those negotiated by private insurers. 4 Maryland's rate-setting system established prices for specific services (i.e., cost centers), but constrained the total costs of a hospitalization at the admission level based on Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), analogous to the IPPS. 1 As with the IPPS, there was no constraint on total hospital spending, meaning that under the state's old payment model, hospitals could increase their revenues by providing more hospital-based care. Although Maryland continues to use allpayer rate-setting, it now constrains hospitals' annual aggregate revenues by setting an all-payer budget for each hospital in the state.
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B. Payment Reforms Prior to the Hospital Global Budget Revenue Program
From 2008 to 2011, Maryland implemented a series of reforms that adjusted hospitals' prices to reflect their performance on risk-adjusted process-and outcomes-based measures of care quality, and which introduced incentives to prevent readmissions among recently discharged patients. One performance objective in the state's payment waiver with CMS, under which Maryland's hospital global budget program was established, was that hospitals would achieve a cumulative 30% reduction in the rate of hospital-acquired conditions over a 5-year period.
Admission-Readmission Revenue Constraint: In 2011, Maryland implemented an Admission
Readmission Revenue Constraint that established, for participating hospitals, a risk-adjusted payment per 30-day episode of inpatient care. Hospitals are required to meet a "target" average charge for all inpatient spending incurred by patients during a 30-day episode of care. The constraint applies to all inpatient spending incurred by patients in the same hospital for an episode, but does not apply to patients receiving care in different hospitals in the 30-day window. Hospitals whose average charges per episode (including the index admission and any readmissions occurring within 30 days of discharge) exceed the target are required to lower their prices. Conversely, hospitals with low average expenditures per episode raise their prices. In practice, this constraint gave hospitals an incentive to reduce readmissions by, for example, improving outpatient care in the post-discharge period.
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II. Details of the Global Budget Revenue Program
In 2014, Maryland introduced a global budget program for all of the state's non-federal acute care hospitals, with the exception of 10 smaller rural hospitals which were already on global budgets. One of these rural hospitals had received a global budget since the 1970s, another transitioned to global budget in 2008, and the 8 remaining rural hospitals were placed under the program in 2010. 1, 9 The rural hospitals served geographically distinct areas of Maryland that are not included in our analyses. 
A. What is included in hospitals' global budgets?
Maryland's global budget program encompasses payments to hospitals for inpatient, hospital outpatient, and emergency department services. The program covers all health care payers and applies to virtually all services billed by Maryland hospitals, including services provided to instate and most out-of-state residents. The one exception is that care for out-of-state patients admitted to Johns Hopkins Hospital and its affiliates in Maryland were initially exempt from the budget. As of 2017, this exemption is no longer implemented.
While out-of-state hospital care for Maryland residents is not part of hospitals' global budgets, the state's payment waiver with CMS requires that aggregate per capita hospital spending growth for all Maryland residents not exceed 3.58% per year, and requires that the state demonstrate a cumulative $330 million in savings (over a five year performance period) for Medicare, based on the difference in per-capita hospital spending growth among fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries in Maryland versus the rest of the country. These tests apply to all Maryland residents, regardless of where they received care (i.e., in or out-of-state hospitals). 10 However, the budgets do not include professional fees to physicians or other providers practicing in or outside of the hospital. In addition to these spending tests, Maryland's waiver also requires hospitals to meet certain quality targets, including reducing readmissions and potentially preventable complications of hospital care.
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B. How are hospital budgets set by Maryland's HSCRC?
Under the global budget program, each hospital is given a fixed annual budget that reflects its baseline utilization and case mix, value-based payments (e.g., quality-based reimbursement), regulated prices, and price updates for forecasted changes in utilization and price inflation. Forecasted utilization is calculated based on hospitals' historical volume and exogenous factors that affect the demand for care, such as changes in the demographic or economic characteristics of hospitals' service areas. Each hospital's budget is calculated as the product of forecasted volume and regulated prices, summed across all services included in the budget.
With a global budget, hospitals cannot increase their revenues by providing more services to patients. Instead, hospitals with excess utilization must lower their prices to remain on budget.
Conversely, prices will rise at hospitals that reduce utilization. Maryland's policy allows hospitals to adjust their prices within a corridor of ±5% over the course of the year to remain within their budgets. Larger price adjustments are permitted, contingent on the review and American Medical Association All rights reserved approval of the HSCRC.
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Hospitals are required to meet their targeted revenues, within a margin of ±0.5%, by the end of the year. Under-budget hospitals are credited a portion of their savings in the following year, while over-budget hospitals are debited the full amount of the overage and face an additional financial penalty (up to 50%) in the following year. This feature of Maryland's program gives hospitals a strong incentive to adjust their prices during the year to remain on budget. 13 By effectively guaranteeing a hospital's annual level of revenue, while constraining its future rate of growth, Maryland policymakers have hoped that this policy would reduce costly hospital use and accelerate hospital investments in primary and preventive care programs that may help to keep patients out of the hospital. Thus, Maryland envisioned the program as both a deterrent to low-value hospital spending and as a catalyst for improvements in care delivery and coordination among hospitals and community-based (including primary care) providers. 10 Because global budgets may create unintended incentives for hospitals to shift the costs of patient care to non-budgeted providers, regulators in Maryland also developed procedures to monitor shifts in patient volume across institutions and to adjust budgets accordingly. Known as "market shift adjustments," these procedures are designed to re-allocate budgeted revenues from hospitals losing volume to those experiencing increases in volume-due to factors other than improvements in care delivery-in a budget-neutral manner. Budgets can also be adjusted to reflect exogenous changes in the demand for hospital care, due to changes in a region's population, insurance rates, or disease incidence (e.g., a flu outbreak).
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C. Hospital payment
Hospitals continue to bill payers at regulated fee-for-service rates. However, payment rates are adjusted over the course of a year so that a hospital's total revenues are equal to its budgeted revenues. Professional payments to physicians practicing inside or outside of the hospital are not regulated by Maryland and consequently not included in the budgets.
D. Additional incentives to improve quality
Maryland's global budget program incorporates the state's previously developed incentives for hospitals to improve care quality and to lower readmissions, which are described above. In addition, the state in 2014 strengthened hospitals' financial incentives to lower readmissions through two new programs. First, Maryland provided a bonus payment (equivalent to 0.5% of budgeted all-payer revenues) to hospitals meeting a targeted reduction in readmissions established by the state. 15 Second, the state implemented a shared savings program that adjusted hospitals' budgets to reflect a targeted amount of savings for expenditures associated with readmissions. For example, if a hospital had $1 million in revenue attributed to readmissions in 2013, and Maryland targeted a 3% reduction in inpatient readmissions the following year, then
American Medical Association All rights reserved the hospital's budgeted readmission revenues for 2014 were reduced to $970 thousand, thus providing a guaranteed minimum savings to payers. If a hospital successfully lowered its readmissions rate below the target, then it was permitted to raise its prices, in effect retaining as profit any additional savings from lowering readmissions beyond the benchmark. 16 Beginning in 2017, the state expanded this shared savings policy to encompass hospital revenues from potentially avoidable admissions (i.e., hospitalizations that could have been prevented through improved outpatient care and care coordination).
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III. Matching of Maryland and Control Counties
To identify a control group, we matched 8 Maryland counties to 27 non-Maryland counties using coarsened exact matching. This section describes how we identified Maryland counties served by hospitals entering the global budget program in 2014, our matching procedure and variables, and the provider-and area-level characteristics of Maryland and matched control counties. 
A. Identifying counties impacted by Maryland's global budget program
B. Matching to control counties
We matched the 8 Maryland counties noted above to control counties outside of the state on the basis of county-level health system and demographic characteristics (excluding counties bordering Maryland to avoid bias from cross-state spillover effects). Based on exploratory analyses of determinants of Medicare hospital admission trends, we matched counties in Maryland to out-of-state control counties on the following area-level characteristics (assessed from the Area Health Resources File): (1) population density, (2) the fraction of the county's population comprised of African Americans, (3) poverty rate, (4) physicians per capita, (5) hospital beds per capita, and (6) hospitals per capita. These county-level variables were predictive of hospital utilization trends in the fee-for-service Medicare population (after controlling for observed patient-level characteristics), and overlapped sufficiently with characteristics of non-Maryland counties to yield a reasonably large control group. We also checked that matching counties on these variables provided acceptable balance on several other county characteristics not used for matching (Panel B of eTable 4).
We used the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) package in R to select control county matches to the 8 GBR counties in Maryland. CEM finds exact matches on "coarsened" variables. 18, 19 The tolerance for selecting nearby (but not exact) matches depends on the amount of coarsening specified by the researcher. We coarsened the county-level variables by categorizing them, using categorical divisions that reflected the distribution of a particular characteristic across all nonMaryland counties. Each of the 8 intervention counties was individually matched to one or more control counties, and we required an exact match on all coarsened variables. eTable 2 summarizes the categories for each county-level variable that we used for matching. Notes: This table displays selected moments of the distributions of area-level variables used in matching Maryland and control counties (Panel A) and other variables not used in matching (Panel B). The unit of analysis is the county, which is not weighted for population size in the statistics presented in this table. Hospital capacity is calculated as: (total short-term hospital bed days)/(total short-term hospital beds * 365.25), where short-term hospital beds exclude hospitals' Skilled Nursing Facility beds. All variables are summarized from the Area Health Resources File (AHRF) compiled by the Health Resources and Services Administration. a Approximate number of total fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries residing in these counties, as reported in the AHRF. Our analyses used a much smaller sample because we used a 20% random sample of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries, and were further limited to beneficiaries with continuous Part A and Part B enrollment in the current and prior year.
IV. Propensity Score Weighting of Beneficiaries
We balanced samples of beneficiaries within the 8 Maryland counties of interest and the 27 matched control counties using weights estimated from a propensity score model. Specifically, we used logistic regression to estimate the probability that a beneficiary resided in Maryland as a function of the observed person-level demographic and health characteristics shown in Table 1 of the main manuscript (including the presence of 27 established chronic conditions reported in the Medicare Chronic Conditions Data Warehouse), plus two-way interactions among a subset of these variables. 1 We used the probabilities p i,t estimated from this regression model to generate balancing weights as follows:
if resides in a control county in period if resides in a Maryland county in period
We weighted observations to balance the observable health and demographic characteristics (on average) of beneficiaries in Maryland and the control counties (see Table 1 of the main manuscript) in each study year. Unlike conventional inverse probability of treatment weights, our approach weights individuals to form comparable treated and control samples, so that our difference-in-difference estimates represent differential changes for comparable beneficiaries in Maryland versus the control counties. 20 Diagnostics of the propensity scores indicated that beneficiaries in the 8 intervention and 27 control counties had sufficiently similar characteristics across years to support comparisons of health care utilization over time. To assess the representativeness of our weighted sample, we compared the distribution of weighted and unweighted samples of patients in Maryland across risk factors for health care use (dual eligibility for Medicare and Medicaid, disability, and HCC scores). 21, 22 Our results, which are reported below, suggest that weighting did not substantively affect the weighted sample's representativeness of the intervention population's clinical and social characteristics. (2014) (2015) (2016) periods. c Propensity score weights were used to balance the observed characteristics of patients in Maryland and the control counties in each study year. After weighting, there were no statistically significant differences, on average, for the patient characteristics shown. d After weighting, there were no statistically significant differential changes, comparing Maryland vs. the control group, from the pre-intervention to the post-intervention periods.
V. Outcome Variables
We assessed the following outcomes:
Hospital stays: We measured hospital use at the patient-year level as the sum of inpatient admissions and observation stays. We included admissions to acute care hospitals, which we measured using the Medicare Provider Analysis and Review file, and observation stays, which we measured using Medicare's outpatient claims file. Observation stays were identified as outpatient file claims with revenue center codes 0760 or 0762. We verified that patients who were first observed and then admitted at the same hospital contributed only once to our count of hospital use for that episode of care. In sensitivity analyses, we separately examined changes in inpatient admissions and observation-unit stays.
30-day return hospital stays:
We assessed the proportion of inpatient admissions and observation stays that were followed by another admission or observation stay, for the same beneficiary, within 30 days. The denominator of this proportion was the number of hospital stays for a patient in a given year, and the numerator was the number of return hospitalizations occurring within 30 days of a previous hospital stay. In a sensitivity analysis, we limited this proportion to just inpatient admissions. Regressions using this variable were weighted by each patient's total hospital stays in the year, which is equivalent to estimating a hospital stay-level model for the probability of returning to the hospital within 30 days. Patients who were not hospitalized at any point in a year were omitted from our analysis of return hospital stays for that year.
Emergency department visits (non-admitted):
We used Medicare's outpatient claim files to count each patient's annual visits to a hospital emergency department. This file captures emergency department visits that did not lead to an admission (admitted ED visits are reported on the MedPAR file and counted towards hospital stays). Non-admitted emergency department visits were identified as claims in the outpatient file with revenue center codes 0450, 0451, 0452, 0456, 0459, or 0981, or with HCPCS codes 99281-99285.
Price-standardized hospital outpatient department utilization:
We assessed price standardized utilization of services in hospital outpatient departments by applying an annual mean national price for services in Medicare's outpatient file (measured at the level of HCPCS codes) to outpatient claims in the corresponding study year. Because hospital prices in Maryland were subject to change under the state's global budget program, we computed mean national prices using only non-Maryland claims, which we applied to claims for both the intervention and control samples prior to aggregating spending. We identified hospital outpatient claims using the Facility Type Code (= 1 for hospitals), and excluded claims with revenue and/or HCPCS codes for observation stays and emergency department visits (defined above).
Primary care visits:
We used the Medicare Carrier (Part B physician/supplier claims) file to identify physician claims for primary care services in outpatient settings (HCPCS procedure codes 99201-99215 billed in independent physician's offices or hospital outpatient departments, indicated by place of service codes 11 and 22). We included services billed by primary care providers (defined as physicians with general practice, family practice, internal medicine, or geriatric specialties, as well as nurse practitioners and physician assistants). In supplementary analyses, we separately assessed primary care services in hospital outpatient departments (for which hospital facility charges in Maryland are subject to global budgets) versus independent physician offices (which are not subject to a budget).
Primary care visit within 7 days of hospital stay:
We assessed the proportion of inpatient admissions and observation stays that were followed by a primary care visit within 7 days of discharge (as defined above). Regressions using this variable were weighted by each patient's total hospital stays in the year. Patients not hospitalized in a given year were omitted from our analyses in that year.
VI. Regression Analysis Details
We assessed differential changes in hospital and outpatient utilization, comparing fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries in the 8 Maryland counties of interest to beneficiaries in 27 matched control counties from before to after the introduction of Maryland's hospital global budget policy. Since Maryland's program is a population-level payment model -providing hospitals with budgets to care for their entire patient population -we determined patient exposure to the policy based on where beneficiaries lived, and conducted analyses on an intention-to-treat basis.
Our main analyses assessed annual differential changes from the baseline period (2009-13) to 2014 (year 1 of the program) and to 2015 (year 2). Specifically, for each outcome Y assessed for patient i living in county c during year t, we estimated a linear regression model of the form:
We controlled for patient-level characteristics measured in each study year, , county fixed effects, (for Maryland and control counties), and year fixed effects (estimated by the regression coefficients ). All models were weighted using propensity score-derived weights that balanced observed characteristics of patients in Maryland and the control counties in each study year. Thus, the regression coefficients and represent adjusted annual differential changes from the full pre-intervention period to 2014 and to 2015, respectively, for comparable Medicare beneficiaries in Maryland and the control counties. Models based on Equation (2) assume that differences between Maryland and the control group would have remained constant past 2014 had Maryland not implemented global budgets. This "parallel trends" assumption, which is standard in difference-in-differences analyses, may lead to biased estimates if preintervention outcomes changed differentially between Maryland and the control group. We test for this below.
Models were estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the county level. Estimates of differential changes through 2015 (year two of Maryland's program) are reported in manuscript Table 2 (third column of estimates), while differential changes through 2014 (year one of the program) are reported in eTable 7, below. Table 2 of the main manuscript for additional information about the outcome measures. b Differential changes estimated using a patient-and year-level linear regression model adjusted for year fixed effects, patient characteristics and geography, and weighted using propensity score-derived weights to balance the observed characteristics of patients in Maryland and the control counties in each year. Confidence intervals were constructed using standard errors clustered at the county level.
A. Test of Parallel Pre Intervention Trends and Specification Checks
To assess the impact of pre-intervention trend differences (between Maryland and the control group) on our estimates, we conducted an additional set of analyses that compared our estimates from regression Equation (2) to estimates after we additionally adjusted for the pre-intervention trend difference between Maryland and the control group. We obtained these estimates from the following linear regression model:
The coefficient represents a linear pre-intervention trend difference between Maryland and the control group, net of any year-specific effects common to both groups (i.e., common time trends, which are absorbed in the year fixed effects). The coefficients are differential changes from 2009-13 to 2014 and from 2009-13 to 2015, respectively, adjusted for pre-intervention trend differences. Equivalently, and represent an adjusted differential change comparing Maryland vs. the control group, net of changes that we would have expected if any widening or narrowing between the groups' pre-intervention trends had continued past 2014 (i.e., assuming differential trends in the absence of Maryland's reform).
If there are no pre-intervention trend differences (i.e., when ), the pairs of estimates ( ) and ( ) will be identical. If, however, our estimates vary substantially across the two specifications, then this suggests that any differential changes detected after Maryland's reform could be an artifact of trend differences that preceded it. Such differences suggest that we cannot be certain whether differential changes in the post-intervention period were driven by the payment change or pre-reform state trends. By comparing estimates from the two sets of models (see Table 2 of the main manuscript), we assess the degree to which our results are sensitive to assumptions about how utilization would have changed in the absence of Maryland's reform.
Models based on regression Equation (3) were weighted to balance observed characteristics of the intervention and control groups in each study year and used robust standard errors clustered at the county level. eTable 9 reports our estimates using the different control groups, which can be compared to our main findings in manuscript Table 2 . Our findings using this alternate control group were substantively unchanged from those of our main analyses. a Differential changes estimated using a patient-and year-level linear regression model adjusted for patient characteristics and geography, and weighted using propensity score-derived weights to balance the observed characteristics of patients in Maryland and urban areas of Medicaid expansion states in each study year. Confidence intervals were constructed using standard errors clustered at the county level.
b See notes to Table 2 of the main manuscript for a description of the outcome measures assessed.
B. Placebo Tests
To further assess whether our analyses showed evidence of effects of Maryland's program, we compared difference-in-differences estimates using this alternate control group to estimates from a series of placebo analyses. To implement the placebo analyses, we iteratively assigned an indicator of treatment status (assuming a 2014 implementation date) to one of the 17 control states listed in eTable 8. In each iteration, we estimated adjusted differential changes comparing the placebo intervention state with the 16 other control states (excluding Maryland). We assessed whether the differential changes in Maryland (solid black line) were observably different from the difference-in-differences estimates from the placebo analyses (gray lines). Figure 1 plots results of these placebo tests: 
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Note that 2013 is analyzed as the reference year in these models, such that estimates are centered at 0 in 2013 and in other years represent differential changes from 2013. Our 2014 and 2015 estimates of differential changes in Maryland (vs. the set of 17 control states that implemented Medicaid expansions) were all well within the range of estimates from the placebo analyses, as were the differential changes in the pre-intervention period (2009-13).
C. Supplemental Outcomes
We examined changes in: (1) observation-unit stays (excluding inpatient admissions); (2) hospital admissions; (3) 30-day inpatient readmissions (excluding observation stays); (4) the proportion of emergency department visits admitted; and (5) primary care visits in physician offices (which are not part of hospitals' budgets) versus hospital-owned outpatient departments (included in hospitals' budgets).
We identified hospital admissions occurring through a hospital's emergency department if any emergency department charges were reported on an inpatient claim (indicating admission through the ED), which we confirmed using the admission source codes reported on claims. We distinguished primary care visits occurring in physician offices versus hospital outpatient departments using the place of service code reported on claims in the Carrier file (place of service code 11 indicated physician offices, while place of service code 22 indicated the HOPD). Figure 1 plots trends for these variables and reports estimates of adjusted differential changes. Similarly, during the pre-intervention period, we observed a trend of declining 30-day readmissions (using inpatient claims only) in Maryland versus the control group, which continued into 2014 and 2015, while slowing modestly in the control group. Consequently, assuming parallel vs. differential tends affects our estimates of post-intervention differential changes in readmissions. To control for secular changes in observation versus inpatient utilization, our main analyses also combined observation-unit and inpatient readmissions into a single measure of hospital use. Consistent with declining admissions in Maryland, we observed a greater rate of decline in the proportion of ED visits in the state, which was most pronounced during the pre-intervention period.
Patients' use of primary care services in hospital outpatient departments increased at a faster rate in the control counties than in Maryland during the pre-intervention period. The trend in the control counties was likely due to increasing vertical integration among physicians and hospitals, and also likely underlies our earlier finding of rising price-standardized hospital outpatient utilization in the control counties relative to Maryland. 25 These trends persisted into the postintervention period, and underlie the negative differential changes we estimated in Maryland from 2013 to 2014 and again from 2013 to 2015. Controlling for this pre-intervention trend difference (i.e., assuming differential trends), we found a small and positive, but not statistically significant, differential change in hospital outpatient department-based primary care use.
Over the study period, primary care use in physicians' offices declined at a slower rate in Maryland versus the control group. This trend difference contributed to the small and statistically insignificant differential increase in office-based primary care visits in Maryland from 2013 to 2014 and again from 2013 to 2015. The change in Maryland appears to be a continuation of trends in the pre-intervention period and not associated with the global budget program, and controlling for this pre-intervention trend difference eliminated our finding of the differential increase. 
